Chapter
V
The Same Subject
Continued
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10,
1787.
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION
then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention.
I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An
entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace:
It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities
amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two
kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by
this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from
all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST
ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you
calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union
may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way
to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs
of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE
THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."
It was remarked in the preceding
paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from
abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than
union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject
is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is
the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives
us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience without paying
the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense
that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find
that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were
almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding
their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really
the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations,
their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long
series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than
they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide
themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen?
Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished?
Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from
all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy
would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests
of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America,
would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like
most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved
in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for
three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would
long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if
it was possible to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be
practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of
such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to
beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another,
we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management
which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest,
and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would
be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound
policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each
of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes,
it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations
or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much
above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors
behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them
to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish
her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated
to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be
necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She
would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but
also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally
creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more
speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations,
whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength,
and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern
of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would
this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same
ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it
formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to
be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to
gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious
and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history
of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to
apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors
than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy,
and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the
situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,
FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears
that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances
offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies,
and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of
resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable
state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states,
into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such
alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed
confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have
its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as
their productions and commodities are different and proper for different
markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different
commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different
degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign
nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation
with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the
one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous
of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed,
would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that
in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse
of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found
taking different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would
be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one
another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should
be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances,
than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves.
And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign
fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it
is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the
Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations
did they under the same character introduce into the governments of
those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether
the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties
would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference
of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS