Chapter
XLI
General View
of the Powers
Conferred by The Constitution
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 19,
1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered
under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum
or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the
restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular
structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among
its several branches.
Under the FIRST view of the
subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers
transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2.
Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction
left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general
government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the
FIRST question.
It cannot have escaped those who
have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive
powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little
considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a
necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences
which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and
on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust,
of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject
cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display
the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric
and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and
may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people
will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a
portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not
of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT,
good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the
public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused.
They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred,
the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary
to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision,
to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power
to the public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment
on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred
on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently
done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the
following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2.
Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of
harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous
objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain
injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within
the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters
of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling
forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger
is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and
essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining
it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary?
No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous,
therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation
establishes this power in the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and
equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power.
It is involved in the power of self-defense.
But was it necessary to give an
INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing
fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in WAR?
The answer to these questions has
been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion
of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and
conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With
what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited
by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution
could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other
nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its
own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in
time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like
manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation?
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger
of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and
by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the
impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants
in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent
of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one
nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service
of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may
be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions.
The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments
in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France.
All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example
not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn
the chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation except France now
to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The
veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor
of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the
liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs;
and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have,
with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments.
A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it
may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences.
On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it
is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation
will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly
preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its
safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity
and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its
liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence
are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it
cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment
which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops,
or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign
ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready
for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of
this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being
rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable
to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never
been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an
extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from
the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security.
A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long
as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be
forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone.
The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things.
The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or
Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII.
did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the same
motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving
from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived
from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent
of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing
armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be
even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the
latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another
quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their
mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition,
jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal
jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot.
A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation
in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other
quarter of the earth bears to Europe.
This picture of the consequences
of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every
man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who
loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish
in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to
set a due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment
of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing
armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated
to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added.
I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have
placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not
be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution,
which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain.
It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires
an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution
has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in
which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just
form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain
the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on
the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot
be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British
Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature,
and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the
longest admissible term.
Had the argument from the British
example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which
supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited
by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited
by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain,
where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great
a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of
the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives,
and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative
body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite
term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond
a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that
the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the
WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be
safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly
limited to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to
betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the
federal government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the
blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt
to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people,
of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention
to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must
terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the
constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from
that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate
to the national defense and the preservation of the Union, can save
America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States
or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these
establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties
and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that
can become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must
be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power
to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution
against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must,
indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as
her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this
will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad.
In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular
advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling
foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be
turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic
frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval
protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly
in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the predatory
spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet
been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration,
by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these instances
of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing
government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance,
but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps
Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern
frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject
than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district
of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large
navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its
commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the
mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious
compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious
demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the
precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions
attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and
depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other
bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition
of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities
have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which
now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of
fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be protected
would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.
The power of regulating and calling
forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing
money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national
defense, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power,
also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust,
been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given
to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection
only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained
to external - taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported
from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be
a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be
a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But
we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to
mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign
commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind
of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress
of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants.
As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation
of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as
domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture,
the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase.
In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part
of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation,
and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than
to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant
for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to
accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity
of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against
the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been
urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited
commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary
for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be
given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections,
than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition
of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have
had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a
reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate
in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press,
the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the
forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms
"to raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection
have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general
terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause
than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought
to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear
it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from
a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms
be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions
be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant
to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural
nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and
qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration
of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning,
and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity,
which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors
of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take
the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary,
as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from
the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States,
as described in article third, are "their common defense, security
of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms
of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war
and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense
or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall
be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A similar language
again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by
the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution,
and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching
themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications
which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited
power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal
to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed
the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use
of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its
own condemnation!
PUBLIUS